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CASE COMMENTS
Demise Of The Pygmy: Seattle School District
No. 1 v. State
In Northshore School District No. 417 v. Kinnear, ' the Wash-
ington Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Wash-
ington system of funding grade school education through state
funds and local property tax levies, ruling the state had satisfied
its explicit obligation under the Washington Constitution to"make ample provision for the education of all [resident] chil-
dren." ' 2 Subsequently, a partially reconstituted court, in Seattle
School District No. I v. State, I overruled the Northshore decision,
holding the system's reliance on special levies to meet expendi-
tures for "basic education"' is an unconstitutional and insuffi-
cient means of meeting the state's duty. Justice Stafford, dissent-
ing in Northshore, termed the majority opinion in that case "a
legal pygmy of doubtful origin" 5 and predicted a short life for the
court's "conifortable 'solution.'"8 Justice Stafford's recent
majority opinion in the Seattle School District case amply ful-
filled his prophecy. Although the Seattle School District court
ultimately reached the proper result, it unfortunately used a
questionable mode of constitutional analysis7 and exceeded un-
necessarily the bounds of its judicial function.'
The Northshore Decision
In Northshore, the Washington Supreme Court fa'ced pri-
marily two alternative issues: whether the Washington Constitu-
1. 84 Wash. 2d 685, 530 P.2d 178 (1974).
2. WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1. See note 12 infra.
3. 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978). The court in Northshore consisted of Chief'Justice Hale, and Justices Finley, Hamilton, Hunter, Rosellini, Stafford, Weaver (pro
tempore), Wright, and Utter. In the Seattle School District case the court consisted of
Chief Justice Wright, and Justices Brachtenbach, Dolliver, Hamilton, Hicks, Horowitz,
Rosellini, Stafford, and Utter. (Names of justices participating in both cases appear in
italics.)
4. For a discussion of the term "basic education," see notes 61 and 65 infra and text
accompanying notes 71-87 infra.
5. 84 Wash. 2d at 732, 530 P.2d at 204.
6. Id.
7. See text accompanying notes 56-58 infra.
8. See text accompanying notes 71-87 infra.
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tion protects a fundamental interest in education that, under
equal protection analysis, would invoke strict judicial scrutiny,'
or whether the state constitution provides an independent basis
for challenging the state's school financing system."' Petitioners
in Northshore presented four issues for resolution based on state
constitutional provisions: (1) whether, under article I, section 12,
the state's financing system denied children equal educational
opportunity;" (2) whether, under article I, section 12, the state's
financing system denied taxpayers protection from unequal tax
burdens; (3) whether, under article IX, section 1, the state had
failed to meet its "paramount duty" to "make ample provision
for the education of all [resident] children;"' 2 and (4) whether,
under article IX, section 2, the state had failed to provide a
"general and uniform" system for distributing educational re-
sources.' 3
The court's decision was highly fragmented, encompassing
five separate opinions. 4 Chief Justice Hale's majority opinion
9. 84 Wash. 2d at 720, 530 P.2d at 198. Conventional equal protection analysis is two-
tiered. If state action abridges a "fundamental interest," e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969) (freedom to travel), or creates a classification based on suspect criteria,
e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (race), courts subject the state action to
strict scrutiny. To be upheld, state action creating a suspect classification or abridging a
fundamental interest must further a compelling state interest. Other state action need
bear only a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose.
10. Apart from equal protection analysis, a state law may be invalid simply because
it abridges a right conferred either by the state constitution or the Federal Constitution,
whether or not the law's purpose is to create a classification. The key is to find a substan-
tive right conferred by the Washington Constitution.
11. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 12 provides:
No law shall be passed granting to any citizen, class of citizens, or corporation
other than municipal, privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall
not equally belong to all citizens, or corporations.
The Washington Supreme Court generally regards this equal privileges and immunities
provision and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution as substantially identical. Texas Co. v. Cohn, 8 Wash. 2d 360, 374,
112 P.2d 522, 529 (1941).
12. WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1 provides:
It is the paramount duty of the state to make ample provision for the education
of all children residing within its borders without distinction or preference on
account of race, color, caste, or sex.
13. WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 2 provides in pertinent part:
The legislature shall provide for a general and uniform system of public schools.
The public school system shall include common schools, and such high schools,
normal schools, and technical schools as may hereafter be established.
14. Chief Justice Hale wrote the majority opinion; Justices Hamilton and Hunter
concurred in that opinion in all respects. Justice Rosellini concurred in the result by
separate opinion, concluding only that petitioners had failed to prove their case. Justice
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held that the United States Supreme Court's decision in San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez5 controlled
the equal education and equal tax burden issues, because the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution and the privileges and immunities
clause of article I, section 12 of the Washington Constitution must
be interpreted identically." He dismissed the "ample provision
for . . . education" issue for lack of proof,7 and concluded the
Wright concurred with Rosellini. Justice Weaver also concurred in the majority result by
separate opinion, taking exception to the dissent's harsh words and concluding only that
petitioners had not established their case. Justice Stafford dissented, taking issue with
the majority's analysis and disregard of the trial court's findings. Laying the ground work
for his majority opinion in Seattle School Dist., Justice Stafford found that article IX, §
1 imposed a paramount constitutional duty on the state to make ample provision for
education of all resident children. In turn, this duty gave rise to a correlative right that is
absolute and can never be impaired. Because the state's school funding system compels
reliance on special levies and because the property tax base in many school districts was
inadequate even to support their operating and maintenance budgets, the state had failed
its obligation and had unconstitutionally impaired an absolute right the court should
enforce. Justice Finely concurred in Justice Stafford's dissent. Justice Utter concurred in
the dissent by separate opinion, but on the ground that the state's constitution should be
construed as demanding more than the Federal Constitution in establishing education as
a fundamental interest. See note 16 infra.
15. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). The court split in a narrow 5-to-4 decision, upholding the Texas
school financing system based on local district real property taxation. The majority found
the existence of "some inequality" in the manner in which the state's school system is
funded inevitable and held such disparities not so irrational as to be invidiously discrimi-
natory. Id. at 51, 55. The dissent, on the other hand, concluded the Texas funding dispari-
ties constituted discriminatory state action under the fourteenth amendment equal pro-
tection clause and found in any event the state had selected a means wholly inappropriate
to the ends it sought to achieve. Id. at 90, 129 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
16. Chief Justice Hale dismissed petitioner's contention that because the duty im-
posed by article IX is the "paramount duty of the state," the state's obligation to adminis-
ter its educational laws is so much greater under the state constitution that compliance
with the fourteenth amendment may fall short of compliance with the state's own equal
protection clause. He concluded that by unbroken precedent the fourteenth amendment
and article I, § 12 have the same meaning and must be applied identically. 84 Wash. 2d
at 720-21, 530 P.2d at 198. See note 29 infra concerning possible reasons for not applying
a higher standard under the state's equal protection clause.
17. In the words of the majority:
Petitioners make virtually no showing whatever as to the standards or curricu-
lum which is or ought to be necessary to meet the State's duty to provide a
common school education for all children, and supply no comparative basis for
a ruling as a matter of law that the State has not been and now is not discharging
its paramount duty. ...
Accordingly, petitioners' first claim of unconstitutionality, that children
who live in school districts with low assessed valuation of property per pupil are
denied equal protection of the laws contrary to the fourteenth amendment to
the United States Constitution and Const. art. 1, § 12, and, therefore, are
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school system was "general and uniform" to the minimum degree
necessary to enable students to transfer between districts without
loss of credit. 8 Unfortunately, the Chief Justice ignored critical
distinctions between Rodriguez and Northshore and miscon-
strued petitioner's argument concerning ample provision for edu-
cation.
As in Northshore, the school financing system in Rodriguez
produced marked interdistrict funding disparities due to substan-
tial reliance on local property tax levies. Plaintiffs in Rodriguez
argued this system unconstitutionally discriminated against poor
people residing in school districts having a low property tax
base, 9 and impermissibly interfered with the exercise of a funda-
mental right.20 Applying fourteenth amendment equal protection
analysis, the district court found in plaintiff's favor, holding
wealth a "suspect" classification and education a fundamental
right.2 ' Under either condition the school financing system could
be upheld only on a showing of a compelling state interest, a
burden the state was unable to meet. 2 The Supreme Court re-
versed, holding first, that wealth itself did not constitute a sus-
pect class requiring strict scrutiny;2 3 second, that because the
Texas school financing system did not create any other class pos-
sessing the traditional indicia of suspectness, 4 no other suspect
victims of the State's failure to discharge its paramount duty to them, is not
* . . supported by the evidentiary data in the case ....
84 Wash. 2d at 695, 707, 530 P.2d at 184-85, 191.
18. By the court's definition a "general and uniform system of public schools" is:
one in which every child in the state has free access to certain minimum and
reasonably standardized educational and instructional facilities and opportuni-
ties to at least the 12th grade-a system administered with that degree of uni-
formity which enables a child to transfer from one district to another within the
same grade without substantial loss of credit or standing and with access by
each student of whatever grade to acquire those skills and training that are
reasonably understood to be fundamental and basic to a sound education.
84 Wash. 2d at 729, 530 P.2d at 202.
19. 411 U.S. at 5, 19 n.49.
20. Id. at 29.
21. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 337 F. Supp. 280, 282-84
(1971).
22. Id. at 282-84.
23. In wealth discrimination cases a suspect class comprises individuals who,
because of their impecunity, are completely unable to pay for some desired benefit and,
as a consequence, sustain an absolute deprivation of a meaningful opportunity to enjoy
that benefit. 411 U.S. at 20.
24. The traditional indicia of suspectness are that the class is saddled with such
disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated
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class could exist; and third, that the system did not abridge a
fundamental interest explicitly or implicitly protected by the
Constitution. 25 After finding neither of the conditions requiring
strict judicial scrutiny, the Court applied a rational relationship
test and concluded such a relationship existed between the state's
legitimate interest in preserving local control and the financing
system employed.2 6 In Northshore, however, Chief Justice Hale
failed to recognize a crucial distinction between the Rodriguez
and Northshore situations. The Washington Constitution, unlike
the Federal Constitution, explicitly provides for education.2 7 Ad-
ditionally, the Rodriguez Court stated that had education been
found to constitute a constitutionally protected interest to which
to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from
the majoritarian political process. Id. at 28.
25. While agreeing with the conclusion of the district court that education was of
immense significance to both the individual and society, id. at 30, the Court determined
that:
It is not the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional
rights in the name of guaranteeing equalprotection of the laws. Thus, the key
to discovering whether education is "fundamental" is not to be found in compar-
isons of the relative societal significance of education . . . .Rather, the answer
lies in assessing whether there is a right to education explicitly or implicitly
guaranteed by the Constitution. . . . Education, of course, is not among the
rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we
find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected.
Id. at 33-35 (citations omitted).
26. The Court found state legislatures are entitled to broad discretion in raising and
disbursing state and local tax revenues and in dealing with the complex and unsettled
problems of financing and managing a public school system. In such circumstances, the
Court concluded judicial restraint was necessary to avoid interfering with continued re-
search and experimentation vital to finding solutions to educational problems and keeping
abreast of changing conditions. Noting that local participation and control in this process
promote public support and are vital to innovation and educational excellence, the Court
determined that the Texas system of school financing encouraged such local control and
participation and satisfied the equal protection clause in furthering a legitimate state
purpose or interest. Id. at 40-55.
The Court's analysis has been criticized for the questionable use of precedent by
which it demonstrated that all roads lead to the minimum rationality test and because:
[Tihe Court's application of the test showed how crucial it was for upholding
the Texas scheme that even slightly heightened scrutiny be avoided at all costs.
For even the minimum rationality hurdle could be cleared only by the same
absence of rigor which characterized the Court's choice of the test in the first
place . . . . The Court's willingness to believe that local funding promotes
local control might at first seem plausible enough. But insofar as local control
is a concomitant of local . . . funding, the Texas system afforded local control
only to the property-rich districts.
L. TMaE, AMERICAN CONsTITUTIONAL LAW 1131 (1978).
27. See note 12 supra.
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the strict scrutiny standard applied, the Texas levy system would
not have passed muster. Because the Washington Constitution
explicitly provides for education as a protected interest, ample
justification existed in Northshore to distinguish Rodriguez and
enter a contrary result.
29
In addition, Chief Justice Hale and the entire Northshore
court chose to consider the "ample provision" question in a sub-
stantive sense-whether the funding provided was "ample" to
meet the educational requirements of the state's school children.
Petitioners had attempted to avoid substantively defining
"ample provision" for reasons of unmanageability and nonjusti-
ciability. 30 Instead, petitioners asserted that where the state con-
28. 411 U.S. at 16-17.
29. The court may have been reluctant to find the school financing system unconsti-
tutional on equal protection grounds, fearing the implications of such a decision on other
state services. If equal protection requires uniformity of per-pupil expenditure between
school districts, or, stated alternatively, if local taxation for local governmental services
is unconstitutional where per-citizen expenditures vary between locales, the same ration-
ale may be applied to other public services delegated to local governmental units, such
as police and fire protection, courts, water, and health services. Id. at 54. In fact, this was
the principal reason the New Jersey Supreme Court declined to apply the United States
Supreme Court's Rodriguez fundamental interest analysis to the explicit provision for
education found in the New Jersey Constitution. Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 173, 303 A.2d
273 (1973). Justice Stafford suggested a means of avoiding this concern in his
Northshore dissent, concluding that the "unique position of public education in the con-
stitutional scheme" served to distinguish education (as the paramount duty of the state)
from other essential services. 84 Wash. 2d at 764-65, 530 P.2d at 221. If Justice Stafford's
paramount duty analysis is unsound, however, so is this distinction. See note 14 supra.
30. Before Northshore, because the issues presented to the courts lacked judicially
manageable standards and were not well suited for judicial resolution, litigation of the
constitutional dimensions of funding public education through local property tax levies
had been unsuccessful. For example, in McInnis v. Shapiro, 239 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill.
1968), plaintiffs alleged such a school financing system violated fourteenth amendment
equal protection and due process provisions. Wide variations in per-pupil expenditures
between districts deprived some students of the educational fulfillment accorded other
students in the system. The district court concluded that the controversy was nonjusticia-
ble, since the complaint would have required the court to determine the "educational
needs" of students in the system in order to measure the degree to which the system
satisfied those needs. Absent such a definition, the court found that "there are no
'discoverable and manageable standards' by which a court can determine when the consti-
tution is satisfied and when it is violated." Id. at 335. Finally, the court concluded that
"if other changes are needed in the present system, they should be sought in the legislature
and not in the courts." Id. at 336-37.
Following McInnis, the district court for the Western District of Virginia dismissed
an action challenging the Virginia school financing system in Burruss v. Wilkerson, 310
F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969). In suggesting that plaintiffs seek legislative relief, the court
noted that it had "neither the knowledge, nor the means, nor the power to tailor the public
moneys to fit the varying needs of [the] students throughout the state." Id. at 574.
Petitioners in Northshore hoped to forestall a similar fate by avoiding the educational
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tribution to funding is so meager that special levies are required,
the state has effectively delegated the decision as to what consti-
tutes "ample provision" to the local districts.3 ' As a procedural
matter, they argued, this delegation is impermissible where local
districts provide vastly disparate educational services.2" Rather
than identifying a particular level of constitutionally required
funding, petitioners asked the court to find that, whatever the
level of education the state chooses to provide, all districts must
afford children equal opportunity to reach that level. 33 Because
petitioners had not introduced conclusive evidence on the sub-
stantive issue, the court found they had failed to prove their
case.34 Justice Stafford's prophetic dissent set the stage for the
litigation that followed on precisely that issue.
Seattle School District No. 1: Northshore Falls
Exactly one year after the Northshore decision, Seattle
School District No. 1, certain named King County taxpayers, and
children enrolled in the district schools brought petitions for
mandamus, prohibition, and declaratory judgment in the Wash-
ington Supreme Court. Petitioners claimed the state had failed
to discharge its "paramount duty" to make "ample provision for
the education" of its resident children pursuant to article IX,
section 1 and to "provide for a general and uniform system of
public schools" pursuant to article IX, section 2.35 After a hearing,
the supreme court referred the matter to the Thurston County
Superior Court for an expedited resolution of all issues of fact and
law, subject to direct appeal to the supreme court.3 1
Following trial, the superior court entered its judgment, de-
claring: (1) the Seattle School District's children have a constitu-
adequacy issue and focusing on the fairness question. Andersen, School Financing in
Washington-The Northshore Litigation and Beyond, 50 WASH. L. REV. 853, 878-80
(1975). See also Brief for Petitioner at 10-18, Northshore School Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear,
84 Wash. 2d 685, 530 P.2d 178 (1974).
31. Brief for Petitioner at 13, Northshore School Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear, 84 Wash.
2d 685, 530 P.2d 178 (1974).
32. Id. at 15-16.
33. Id. at 16-18. This approach is in accord with the holding in Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954): Educational opportunity, "where the state has under-
taken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms."
34. See note 17 supra.
35. 90 Wash. 2d at 486, 585 P.2d at 78.
36. Petitions for writs of mandamus and prohibition directed to state officers are filed
directly in the Washington Supreme Court. WASH. R. App. PROC. 16.2(b).
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tional right to an adequately funded educational program; (2) the
legislature is required to fund, or provide dependable and regular
tax sources for funding, a basic37 program of education; (3) the
state's reliance, in whole or in part, on a funding system that
incorporates special levies to fund "basic education" is unconsti-
tutional; and (4) special levies may be used to fund only
"enrichment programs. 38 Appellants39 assigned error to numer-
ous factual and legal conclusions and appealed the judgment."'
The supreme court affirmed.
After resolving several threshold issues," Justice Stafford's
majority opinion undertook a comprehensive examination of arti-
cle IX, section 1. From this examination he concluded that article
IX, section 1 creates a judicially enforceable duty on the state to
fund education at a minimum level. He then outlined the nature
and scope of that duty and established the legislative responses
necessary for its discharge.
In concluding that article IX, section 142 creates a judicially
enforceable duty, the majority opinion rejected the argument
that section 1 is merely a preamble, or policy declaration, without
enforceable substantive effect and rejected appellants' argument
concerning the placement and publisher's titling of section 1.1
3
Attributing particular significance to the framers' choice of the
37. The Washington Constitution contains no provision concerning "basic" educa-
tion. The trial judge apparently introduced the term to limit the scope of article IX, § 1
to judicially manageable proportions. See notes 61 & 65 infra and text accompanying
notes 71-87 infra.
38. 90 Wash. 2d at 486-89, 585 P.2d at 78-80. The court defined enrichment programs
as all educational programs exceeding the basic education required by article IX, § 1.
Id. at 487, 585 P.2d at 79.
39. Appellants were the State of Washington, the Speaker of the House of Represent-
atives and the President of the Senate as representatives of the legislature, the Superin-
tendent of Public Instruction, the State Treasurer, and each member of the State Board
of Education. Id. at 486, 585 P.2d at 78.
40. Id. at 486-89, 585 P.2d at 78-80. The trial court entered 698 findings of fact, 102
conclusions of law, and 47 paragraphs of judgment. Appellants assigned error to 9 findings
of fact, 41 conclusions of law, and 37 paragraphs of judgment.
41. The court considered and resolved that: (1) rendering a declaratory judgment was
appropriate in this case; (2) the petitioners had standing to seek declaratory relief; and
(3) the court had jurisdiction to decide the constitutional issue. 90 Wash. 2d at 489-97,
585 P.2d at 80-84.
42. See note 12 supra.
43. Appellants argued that the location of § 1 of article IX and the Washington code
publishers' consistent denomination of § 1 as "Preamble" indicate § 1 is merely a prefa-
tory statement of purpose lacking legal force. 90 Wash. 2d at 497, 585 P.2d at 84.
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words "paramount duty,"" the court concluded that, rather
than "explaining goals, or designating objectives to be accom-
plished," section 1 "is declarative of a constitutionally imposed
duty" having substantive implications beyond the mere estab-
lishment of a "general and uniform system of public schools." 5
Finding no indication that article IX, section 1 is to be accorded
anything less than its plain meaning and that the framers de-
clared only once in the entire Washington Constitution that a
specified function is the state's paramount duty, the court con-
cluded that, by imposing upon the state a paramount duty to
make ample provision for the education of all resident children,
the Washington Constitution created "a duty that is supreme,
preeminent, or dominant.""
Other interpretations of article IX, section 1, however, are
equally plausible and, perhaps, more logically consistent. If, as
the court seems to believe, the paramount duty of the state is to
make ample provision for education, all other state functions are
subordinate. 7 As the court recognized in Northshore, however,
such an interpretation is inconceivable. 8 Considering the status
44. The court noted that:
Nothing contained in [article IX, § 11 or in the Journal of the Washington State
Constitutional Convention of 1889 (1962) indicates that Const. art. 9, § 1 was
intended to have the subordinate status of a mere preamble or that the language
"paramount duty" was to be accorded anything less than its plain meaning.
Unlike the hortatory language found in the education articles of other states,
nothing in Const. art. 9, § 1 suggests that it does not actually declare the State's
educational duty. Without question the language used by other states was before
the drafters of our state constitution. But, it is significant that such vague
laudatory language was rejected and the specific term paramount duty was
adopted. There is no doubt the imperative wording . . . was intentional.
Id. at 498-99, 585 P.2d at 85.
45. Appellants argued that the framers of the state constitution had intended only
that § 1 be implemented through the general and uniform system of public schools to be
provided under article IX, § 2. See note 13 supra. The court concluded that if the framers
had intended to equate the state's paramount duty with provision of a general and uniform
school system, they would have said so expressly. Because they provided instead that the
paramount duty of the state was to make ample provision for education, such "ample
provision" must possess substantive content beyond the mere requirement of a general
and uniform school system. 90 Wash. 2d at 499, 585 P.2d at 85.
46. Id. at 511, 585 P.2d at 91.
47. In support of this conclusion, the court quoted Stiles, The Constitution of the
State and Its Effects upon.Public Interests, 4 WASH. HIST. Q. 281, 284 (1913): "One who
carefully reads Article IX might also wonder whether, after giving to the school fund all
that is here required to be given, anything would be left for other purposes." 90 Wash. 2d
at 511, 585 P.2d at 91.
48. The majority in Northshore noted that:
As heavy as the duty may be acknowledged to be-and no one denies that free
public education is one of the great responsibilities of the state-we cannot
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of public education at the time the framers drafted the Washing-
ton Constitution," a more likely intention was to place principal
responsibility for providing education on the state, rather than on
private individuals. The drafters of section 1 of article IX reason-
ably intended to make clear that the state, rather than individu-
als or local communities, holds the paramount duty to make
ample provision for education. This interpretation of the drafters'
purpose would not result in the absurdity that is the logical exten-
sion of the court's holding in Seattle School District No. 1. No one
seriously can contend, for example, that provision for education
takes precedence over other necessary expenditures in time of
state emergency. Yet, this is the clear implication of the court's
interpretation of "paramount duty." Under the court's interpre-
tation, section 1 constitutes more than a statement of policy; it
creates a judicially enforceable, absolute obligation.
Although recognizing that not all constitutionally imposed
duties are judicially enforceable, 50 the Seattle School District
construe the phrase to have such indomitable consequences in relation to all
other parts of the State constitution.
We cannot hold this duty to be the be-all and end-all, the alpha and omega of
state government . . . . If, as their argument implies, the term "paramount
duty" to make ample provision for the education of all children imposes a
supreme and overriding duty upon the state to the denigration or reduction of
all other duties constitutionally imposed or statutorily assumed, then it follows
that any tax may be imposed and any public funds. . . may be preempted and
allocated to schools by decree of this court of "the paramount duty." This, of
course, was not the intendment of the constitution ....
84 Wash. 2d at 714-16, 530 P.2d at 194-95.
49. Prior to the "great reform" of 1850-1900, most people regarded education as an
individual, religious, or charitable enterprise. J. COONS, W. CLUNE & S. SUGARMAN, PRI-
VATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 47 (1970) [hereinafter cited as COONS]; N. EDWARDS
& H. RICHEY, THE SCHOOL IN THE AMERICAN SOCIAL ORDER 293, 299 (2d ed. 1963); S. NOBEL,
A HISTORY OF AMERICAN EDUCATION 166-67 (1954). "Public" education consisted of reli-
giously or philanthropically financed charity schools and rate-bill schools, which taxed the
parents of attending children. Both were infamously inadequate. Progress toward state
support for public education was grudging and gradual. State governments, unwilling to
assume the task of educating, delegated responsibility to the smallest possible local
unit-parents of school children and local communities. COONS, supra, at 47-48.
The eventual compromise of responsibilities for education balanced local control of
financing against the quality and equality of education. Given the relative uniformity of
wealth and population distribution of the early 1800's, the system was tolerable, but the
economic revolution following the Civil War upset this balance and many localities found
themselves wholly unable to finance adequate education. COONS, supra.
50. Specifically, the court conceded that duties committed solely to the legislature
are nonjusticiable. 90 Wash. 2d at 501-04, 585 P.2d at 86-87. The court pointed out that
the language of article IX, § 1 addresses not the legislature exclusively, but the state
generally. Id. at 501, 506, 585 P.2d at 86, 88. On the other hand, the court also recognized
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court acknowledged it had the power to enforce the state's consti-
tutional duty to make ample provision for education."' The court
concluded, however, that the real dispute was not judicial en-
forceability per se, but disagreement over which governmental
body has the power to interpret and construe section 1.52 Appel-
lants had argued that because article IX, section 1 is not self-
executing, the duty imposed rests solely on the legislature.53 Be-
cause the sole remedy for breach of such a duty lies with the
voters, any judicial enforcement of the duty or any attempt to
give it substantive content would violate the separation of powers
doctrine.54 The court, on the other hand, found interpretation and
construction of the constitution to be exclusively judicial func-
tions: "[O]nce it is determined that judicial interpretation and
construction are required, there remains no separation of powers
issue. Thereafter, the matter is strictly one of judicial
discretion. "I' Analysis of this issue ultimately turns on judicial
competence to give substantive definition to the phrase "ample
provision for . . . education," a matter discussed at length in the
concurring and dissenting opinions.
Having determined that section 1 imposes a substantive duty
on the state to make ample provision for the education of all
resident children, the court then examined the natur6of the duty.
The court applied Hohfeldian analysis,5 a theoretical construct
for evaluating, inter alia, the creation of rights and the imposition
of duties. Under Hohfeldian analysis, the jural correlative of the
state's duty to provide for education is the children's right to be
provided with education. Because the children's right to educa-
tion arises through interpretation of the state constitution, the
court labeled it a true right, and, applying its conception of pure
Hohfeldian analysis, stated that a true right is absolute. Thus,
the state's duty to make ample provision for education cannot
be relieved for any reason.57 Accordingly, the court declined to
that the duty of § 1 is not self-executing; the legislature must act to discharge it. Id. at
504, 523, 585 P.2d at 87-88, 97.
51. Id. at 502, 585 P.2d at 86-87.
52. Id. at 503, 585 P.2d at 87.
53. Id. at 504, 585 P.2d at 87-88. See also note 50 supra.
54. 90 Wash. 2d at 504, 585 P.2d at 87-88.
55. Id. at 504-05, 585 P.2d at 88.
56. W. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTONS (W. Cook ed. 1923). Hohfeld,
Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16
(1913).
57. 90 Wash. 2d at 513 n.13, 585 P.2d at 92 n.13. The court concluded that true rights
are created by a positive constitutional grant or, by Hohfeldian analysis, follow from an
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consider whether the state had a compelling reason for failing to
comply with its constitutional duty; the exclusive and critical
question asked was whether the state in fact had fulfilled its duty
to provide for education.
To answer this question, the court considered the scope of the
state's duty. The court acknowledged that the state must fulfill
its duty by means of a general and. uniform system of public
schools.5 Accepting the trial court's definitions of ample, provi-
sion, and education,59 the supreme court held the state's duty to
make ample provision for education requires full funding for the
state public school system, 0 but only to the extent of "basic
education."'" Furthermore, the court concluded full funding for
basic education means dependable and regular tax revenues."2
affirmatively imposed constitutional duty. Hohfeld's analysis, however, does not distin-
guish between rights that exist by virtue of a positive constitutional grant and those that
exist because constitutions have provided for noninterference with a specific legal entitle-
ment. Noninterference is, in fact, a duty imposed on the state and the jural correlative of
the right to the specific legal entitlement. See generally W. HOHFELD, supra note 56, at
36-43. The enjoyment of any right presupposes noninterference. Given a sufficiently
grievous exigency, it is difficult to imagine any right guaranteed by the Constitution a
court could not impair at least temporarily. In any event, in none of his writings did
Hohfeld assert that true rights are absolute.
58. 90 Wash."2d at 513, 585 P.2d at 92.
59. For purposes of article IX, § 1, the trial court provided the following definitions:
"[Aimple" means liberal, unrestrained, without parsimony, fully sufficient;
"provision" means preparation, measures taken beforehand, for the supply of
wants, measures taken for a future exigency; "education" in its total sense
comprehends all that series of instruction and discipline which is intended to
enlighten the understanding, correct the temper, and form the manners and
habits of youth, and fit them for usefulness in the future. In its most extended
signification it may be defined, in reference to man, to be the act of developing
and cultivating the various physical, intellectual, aesthetic and moral faculties.
Id. at 516, 585 P.2d at 93-94.
60. Id. at 518, 585 P.2d at 95.
61. Id. at 519, 585 P.2d at 95. No substantive standards were available to the court
from which to divine those programs of education constitutionally required by article IX,
§ 1. Recognizing the absurdity of requiring the legislature to fund all education encom-
passed within the scope of the ordinary meaning of the word, the court inserted the
adjective "basic" to reduce the concept to manageable proportions. Giving no explanation
of the derivation of its newly created concept, and declining to define what it meant by
"basic education," the court noted that the state's constitutional duty "embraces broad
educational opportunities needed in the contemporary setting to equip their children for
their role as citizens and as potential competitors in today's market as well as in the
market-place of ideas," and that it must prepare them to "participate intelligently and
effectively in our open political system" and "to be able to inquire, to study, to evaluate
and to gain maturity and understanding." Id. at 517-18, 585 P.2d at 94-95.
62. Id. at 520, 585 P.2d at 96.
19791 State Funding of Schools
Because special levies are neither dependable nor regular,"3 the
court concluded any statutory scheme authorizing use of special
excess levies to fund basic education is unconstitutional." To
fulfill its absolute duty to provide for education, the legislature
must, by July 1, 1981, define "basic education," determine the
level of funding sufficient to allow school districts to provide chil-
dren with basic education, and provide such finding through
regular and dependable tax sources."
Criticizing the Majority: Justice Utter Concurs, Justice Rosellini
Dissents
Justice Utter concurred with the majority's result, but on
limited grounds. He found the state had not met its
"constitutional duty to fund ample education in a general and
uniform way.""6 Reading article IX, section 1 to guarantee the
state's children a right of education "without distinction or pref-
erence," 7 and article IX, section 2 to require a general and uni-
form system of public schools, 8 he concluded the state constitu-
tion's drafters contemplated an educational system that, through
statewide planning and financial support, affords each child an
equal opportunity to learn. 9 The challenged system of local levy
63. Terming the statutory system "unstable," the court found special levies were
wholly "dependent on the whim of the electorate and . . . then available only on a
temporary basis." Id. at 525, 585 P.2d at 98.
64. Id. at 526, 585 P.2d at 99. The court, however, did not prohibit all resort to special
levies. The court permits the legislature to use such levies to fund enrichment programs,
activities, and support services that go beyond the basic education required by the consti-
tution. Id. at 526-27, 585 P.2d at 99.
65. The court noted that the legislature
has not as yet fully implemented Const. art. 9, §§ 1 and 2 by defining or giving
substantive content to "basic education" or a basic program of education. Thus,
the Legislature must hereafter act to comply with its constitutional duty by
defining and giving substantive meaning to them.
Finally, the constitution requires more than a mere definition of "basic
education" or a basic program of education .... [T]he state also has an
affirmative paramount duty to make ample provision for funding the "basic
education" or program of education defined. This funding must be accom-
plished by means of dependable and regular tax sources and cannot be depen-
dent on special excess levies.
Id. at 519-20, 585 P.2d at 95-96.
66. Id. at 545, 585 P.2d at 109 (Utter, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 546-47, 585 P.2d at 109. See note 12 supra.
68. See note 13 supra.
69. 90 Wash. 2d at 547, 585 P.2d at 109. This conclusion comports with the require-
ment of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), that where a state has under-
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financing is unconstitutional because it violates both the letter
and spirit of this egalitarian promise.70 Finding it unnecessary to
give substantive content to the "paramount duty" of article IX,
section 1, Justice Utter commented:
Having found the challenged system to be unconstitutional,
I should not reach beyond such holding to find with the majority
that the constitution mandates a specific "basic education" be
provided the state's children. For the court to cast in terms of a
constitutional doctrine the meaning of this term properly sub-
jects it to the criticism voiced by the dissent, and deprives the
people of this state of a continuing legislative and political dia-
logue on what constitutes a proper education.7'
In his dissent, Justice Rosellini chastised the majority for
assuming the legislative function of defining the state's minimum
education level.72 He concluded that this issue was not well suited
for judicial resolution because no justiciable controversy was be-
fore the court; petitioners made no showing that the legislature
had failed to perform its duty to support public schools in the
petitioner school district. 3 By Justice Rosellini's interpretation,
the constitution does not impose a judicially enforceable duty on
the legislature to provide such support, and the judgment of the
court wrongfully interfered with the functions of the legislature
and was unenforceable and inimical to the welfare of the citi-
zenry.7" Reading article IX as a whole, he observed that nothing
in that article directs the legislature to raise revenue to supple-
taken to provide it, educational opportunity is a right which must be made available to
all on equal terms. See note 33 supra.
70. In his words, "The system of local levy financing challenged here is an anathema
to the egalitarian promise of these provisions, violating them in both letter and spirit."
90 Wash. 2d at 547, 585 P.2d at 109.
71. Id., 585 P.2d at 109.
72. Id. at 563, 585 P.2d at 119 (Rosellini, J., dissenting). Before the court could
determine if the state had fulfilled its constitutional duty to fund basic education in the
Seattle School District, the court needed a definition of "basic education." Because the
legislature had not provided one the court itself defined basic education. Id.
73. In support of this conclusion Justice Rosellini pointed out that the school district
had failed to prove the funds available to it were not sufficient to discharge the state's
duty to provide ample education to resident children where the district actually had an
$8 million surplus. Id. at 564, 585 P.2d at 120. In addition, the average salaries of the
district's certified and classified employees were above the state average; the increase in
pupil-staff ratios was minimal; and there was no proof of a positive relationship between
salaries, pupil-teacher ratios, or expenditures per pupil and educational achievement. On
this record he could not find that the funds available to the school district were insuffi-
cient. Id. at 564-67, 585 P.2d at 120-22.
74. Id. at 583, 585 P.2d at 130.
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ment the school funds created by section 3; rather, it empowers
the legislature to do so. The court, he concluded, cannot interpret
a permissive grant of discretionary power to create a mandatory
duty."
Finally, Justice Rosellini noted that resolving this case re-
quired the court to define "ample" funding for "basic education"
in the petitioner school district. Thus, the court entered upon a
policy determination for which no judicially manageable stan-
dards exist and for which the court has neither the facilities to
acquire the knowledge nor the expertise necessary to give content
to those terms."6 Furthermore, the terms would require continuing
subjective and discretionary judgments as to their meaning to
75. Throughout article IX, and in particular § 3, which establishes a common school
fund to apply exclusively to the support of common schools, the legislature's participation
in school funding is framed in discretionary, permissive terms:
The legislature may make further provisions for enlarging said fund.
. . . The sources of said fund shall be . . . such other sources as the legisla-
ture may direct.
To the extent that the moneys in the common school construction fund are
in excess of the amount necessary to allow fulfillment of the purpose of said
fund, the excess shall be available for deposit . . . or . . . current use of the
common schools, as the legislature may direct.
WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 3 (emphasis added). As.Justice Rosellini noted, "How then can
it be construed to impose upon the legislature a mandatory, affirmative duty to levy taxes
and appropriate money for the support of the schools?" 90 Wash. 2d at 571, 585 P.2d at
124 (emphasis added).
76. Justice Rosellini observed:
The words "education" and "ample" are both capable of broad or narrow mean-
ing depending upon the viewpoint of the user. Also, the content of both is apt
to change with changing times. Both cry out for the exercise of legislative wis-
dom and discretion.
The majority sees that the word "education" is so broad that the imposition
of a mandatory duty to support a complete education would be intolerable. By
judicial fiat, it adds an adjective and narrows the meaning to something which
it deems manageable.
Having decided that the term "education" as used in Const. art. 9, § 2, is
a narrow one, actually meaning only "basic education," the majority had next
found it necessary to provide the legislature with guidelines to aid that body in
deciding what courses . . . to fund[,J [a]pparently . . . because there is no
commonly accepted notion of what constitutes "basic education," just as there
is no commonly accepted notion of what comprises an "education."
The school financing problem is vastly more complicated than the mere
designation and funding of a minimum program. It is not within the expertise
of the court to comprehend its complexities . . . . Neither has it the facilities
to acquire the knowledge which would support an intelligent judgment.
Id. at 572-75, 585 P.2d at 124-26. See also San Antonio Independent School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 89 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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reflect the changing needs of society." By requiring the current
legislature to establish the constitutional dimensions of basic
education, subject to judicial approval in some later litigation,
the court would bind future legislatures to an educational pro-
gram that might not reflect the best interests of the state's citi-
zens.78 By limiting the means available to fund this educational
package,79 the court interfered with the exercise of the legisla-
ture's independent judgment in raising and allocating state reve-
nues, a power constitutionally reserved to that department.
0
Both Justices Utter and Rosellini criticized the majority for
answering a political question properly within the legislative
ambit.11 Thus, in the strictest sense, the issue of defining basic
education is nonjusticiable11 The majority relied on Marbury v.
77. The concept of basic education extant at the drafting of the Washington Constitu-
tion could not meet current basic educational needs, and a contemporary concept will not
meet the educational needs of society 50 years from now. Thus, "flexibility in the choice
of educational programs and legislative discretion in the funding of them are necessary if
the best interests of the children of this state and the people as a whole are to be served."
90 Wash. 2d at 574, 585 P.2d at 125.
78. Id., 585 P.2d at 125. See id. at 547, 585 P.2d at 109 (Utter, J., concurring).
79. The majority declared that "any statutory scheme which authorizes the use of
special excess levies to discharge the State's paramount duty of making ample provision
for 'basic education'" is unconstitutional. Id. at 526, 585 P.2d at 99 (emphasis added).
80. In Justice Rosellini's words: "The majority's action disturbs the legislature's
constitutional power to decide what revenues shall be raised and how the funds in the
public treasury shall be appropriated and allocated among the various offices, institutions
and services of the state." Id. at 563, 585 P.2d at 120 (Rosellini, J., dissenting).
81. Both Justice Utter and Justice Rosellini agreed that the issue of the adequacy of
public education belongs to the legislature with its unique factfinding and opinion gather-
ing capabilities. Because a court necessarily limits its inquiry to the interests of the
particular litigants, the result does not reflect the collective judgment of the representa-
tives of all those with a stake in the outcome. Id. at 547, 551, 574-75, 585 P.2d at 109, 112,
125-26.
82. Although the political question doctrine is somewhat confused, finding expression
in at least three different theories of government, the United States Supreme Court has
identified several factors as defining a nonjusticiable political question:
It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly according to the
settings in which the questions arise may describe a political question, although
each one has one or more elements which identify it as essentially a function of
the separation of powers. Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve
a political question is found [1] a textually demonstrable constitutional com-
mitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court's undertak-
ing independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence
to a political decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of embarassment
[sic] from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one ques-
tion.
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Madison and its more recent progeny 4 for the proposition that
constitutional interpretation and construction are within the ex-
clusive province of the judiciary.s But even the Marbury Court
envisaged political institutions resolving at least some constitu-
tional issues." Indeed, this is explicit in the Rodriguez Court's
recognition that questions of educational policy require legisla-
tive resolution. 7 The court, therefore, should not have assumed
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
The first three of these factors suggest sufficient grounds for classifying the issue of
"ample provision for . ..education" as a political question. Precedent in other courts,
the various economic, social, and philosophical problems involved, and the court's lack
of competence to resolve the issue all point to the absence of judicially manageable
standards. In addition, throughout its decision the majority recognizes that the ultimate
duty to give substantive definition to the provisions of article IX, § 1 rests with the
legislature. See, e.g., 90 Wash. 2d at 518-19, 585 P.2d at 95. Nevertheless, the court itself
makes the initial policy decision necessary to resolve the case by finding that ample
provision for education had not been made with respect to the petitioner school district.
Id. at 536-37, 585 P.2d at 104. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 71-
79 (1978) (discussing the political question doctrine).
83. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
84. The majority cites, for example, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974);
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) and
numerous state cases in accord therewith. 90 Wash. 2d at 496-97, 503-04, 506-08, 585 P.2d
at 83-84, 87-88, 93.
85. See text accompanying notes 52 & 55 supra.
86. The Court in Marbury noted that:
By the Constitution of the United States, the President is invested with certain
important powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion, and
is accountable only to his country in his political character and to his own
conscience ....
. . .[Wihatever opinion may be entertained of the manner in which exec-
utive discretion may be used, still there exists, and can exist, no power to control
that discretion. The subjects are political.
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 165-66.
87. The Rodriguez Court concluded:
Education . ..presents a myriad of "intractable economic, social, and
even philosophical problems." . . . On even the most basic questions in this
area the scholars and educational experts are divided . . . .The ultimate wis-
dom as to [financing, expenditures, the proper goals of a system of public
education, effective management,] and related problems of education is not
likely to be divined for all time even by the scholars who now so earnestly debate
the issues.
The consideration and initiation of fundamental reforms with respect to
state taxation and education are matters reserved for the legislative processes
of the various States . . . .We hardly need add that this Court's action today
is not to be viewed as placing its judicial imprimatur on the status quo. The
need is apparent for reform in tax systems which may well have relied too'long
on the local property tax. And certainly innovative thinking . . . is necessary
to assure both a higher level of quality and greater uniformity of opportunity.
These matters merit the continued attention of the scholars who already have
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the task of defining minimum education for the Seattle School
District nor should the court have found that the constitution
mandates a specific basic education requiring legislative defini-
tion. Indeed, Washington lawmakers had acted during the pen-
dency of the appeal and, in light of the extensive school financing
legislation passed,8 the court's action was particularly inappro-
priate .81
Conclusion
The Seattle School District court could have avoided ventur-
ing beyond the conventional bounds of judicial function and dis-
pensed with its dubious Hohfeldian analysis by adopting Justice
Utter's analysis, applying traditional equal protection analysis,
0
or adopting an independent basis for reviewing article IX." There
is ample ground to conclude, under any standard the court
wished to apply, that if the state's purpose in using special excess
levies to fund education was to maximize local control and local
initiative,9 2 the Washington levy system was not rationally re-
contributed much by their challenges. But the ultimate solutions must come
from the lawmakers and from the democratic pressures of those who elect them.
411 U.S. at 42-43, 58-59 (emphasis added; citations omitted).
88. That legislation is contained principally in two acts: the Washington Basic Edu-
cation Act of 1977, ch. 359, 1977 Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess., and the "Levy Lid" Act, ch.
325, 1977 Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. The Basic Education Act defines the basic educational
program to be provided under the act, including goals, program requirements, and the
determination of state resources to implement the program. The Levy Lid Act provides a
permanent lid of 10 per cent of the local school district budget on the amount of money a
district can be asked to fund through special excess levies. The majority noted the passage
of these laws in a footnote, but declined to pass on their constitutionality because the trial
court had not considered them. 90 Wash. 2d at 519 n.14, 585 P.2d at 95 n.14. Justice Utter,
in his concurring opinion, did not share the view that the court could not consider the
legislature's recent activities:
This court has often sustained the proposition that the law governing a case
on appeal is that applicable at the time of the disposition of the appeal, not that
existing at the time of the trial court's decision.
Id. at 550, 585 P.2d at 111 (Utter, J., concurring).
89. This is not to say the court should not have decided the case, only that the mode
of constitutional analysis employed and the scope of the court's decision were inappro-
priate.
90.. Recall, however, that implications other than the fundamental interest concerns
of Rodriguez may be involved. See note 29 supra.
91. See note 10 supra.
92. The majority in Northshore states that special excess levies are not only
consistent with local participation in school administration but are the most
vital and effective means by which the people of a given school district may
maintain, improve and enhance the processes of education for their children
without at the same time depriving the parents of children of other districts from
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lated to that purpose. By first finding that present state funding
of local school districts is inadequate to provide basic education
and that a minimum level of funding is essential to true local
control, the Seattle School District court effectively concluded
the levy system is not rationally related to achieving local control
and, in fact, defeats true local control. That is, without minimum
funding, local districts lack the means to make meaningful deci-
sions about educational programming. 3
If the Washington special excess levy system were truly dedi-
cated to local fiscal control, one would expect the quality of edu-
cational opportunity provided in each district to vary with the
decision of the voters in that district as to the level of sacrifice
they wish to make for public education. The Washington system
is incapable of producing the desired result. Local school districts
cannot choose to have the best education in the state by imposing
the highest tax rate. Instead, a district's taxable wealth, a factor
over which local voters exercise little control, largely determines
the quality of education that district can offer its children. Thus,
a special levy financing system based on local district wealth
bears no rational relationship to the goal of providing local dis-
tricts a meaningful option to improve educational opportunities
to the extent increased funding would achieve that goal.
The Northshore court's unfortunate framing of the issue of
ample provision for education in terms of the state's substantive
duty directly influenced the conclusions of the Seattle School
District court. Although reaching the proper result, the Seattle
School District court not only used questionable analysis to con-
doing the same.
84 Wash. 2d at 711-12, 530 P.2d at 193. See also San Antonio Independent School Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 48-50 (discussing the merits of local control).
93. As the California Supreme Court noted in Serrano v. Priest:
[S]o long as the assessed valuation within a district's boundaries is a major
determinant of how much it can spend for schools, only a district with a large
tax base will be truly able to decide how much it really cares about education.
The poor district cannot freely choose to tax itself into an excellence which its
tax rolls cannot provide. Far from being necessary to promote local fiscal choice,
the present financial system actually deprives the less wealthy districts of that
option.
5 Cal. 3d 584, 611, 487 P.2d 1241, 1260, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 620 (1971). In Serrano, the
California court held the state's financing system, which derived more than half its public
school funds from property taxes levied by local school districts, discriminated among
citizens on the basis of wealth, that such a classification was suspect, that it infringed on
a fundamental interest, and that local participation and control did not present a compel-
ling state interest justifying such discrimination. Thus, the California public school sys-
tem violated the equal protection provisions of the Califorpia Constitution.
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clude the state had a substantive duty to provide basic education,
but also exceeded unnecessarily the conventional bounds of judi-
cial function and interfered with the legislature's ability to exer-
cise its independent judgment in matters outside the court's ex-
pertise.
Warren C. Thompson III
